INTRODUCTION
There has recently been a minor research and publishing boom in the field of refusals of royal assent to Bills in Australia. 1 When in the throes of finalising my own contribution to this outburst of scholarship, I discovered that the figurehead German Federal President had just refused his assent to two government Bills passed by the Bundestag (the lower house of Parliament). In the two cases, which occurred in October and December 2006, the Federal President acted because he thought the proposed statute unconstitutional. Further research revealed that these were the seventh and eighth refusals of assent by a Federal President against the government's wishes since the foundation of the Federal Republic in 1949. As a result, there is a long-running academic debate in Germany about the circumstances in which the figurehead Federal President may refuse assent. Some scholars even permit the Federal President to assess every proposed law to ensure that it complies with the constitutional charter of rights, while others take a more restrictive view and confine his task to errors of parliamentary procedure and/or restrictions on law-making power other than those to be found in the charter of rights.
The Crown as we know it today would be most unlikely to take on any of these roles. In Australian constitutional history there are few examples of refusal of assent to legislation; most are anomalous in some way, or based on a colonial relationship that no longer exists. 2 The last -and highly irregular -refusal of assent of which I am Chancellor a person with the confidence of the Bundestag. 11 This is the system of responsible government to which we are well used. Clearly, therefore, the Federal President does not have a personal policy-based discretion in deciding whether to assent to Bills, as the United States President does. 12 In Germany, it is however common for the Federal President to be a former politician -for example, two recent Federal Presidents have been former State Premiers. At the very least each Federal President is elected as the candidate of a political party in the Bundesversammlung, and the election of a party's candidate is seen as a victory for the party concerned, even if one achieved usually by coalition-building prior to the election. Needless to say, those elected are expected to carry out the duties of their office without regard to party politics.
Given the party-political nature of the process of election, it is harder to imagine popular non-political figures equivalent to John Landy and Marjorie Jackson-Nelson becoming the German head of state. In saying this I am not making any extraneous point. Australian political and constitutional culture, if faced with the same set of formal rules as in Germany, might produce either the same or a significantly different result in practice.
The current Federal President, who vetoed two Bills towards the end of 2006, is Dr Horst Köhler. He was elected by 604 votes to 589 on 23 May 2004 as the candidate of the conservative Christian Democrats, of which party he was a long-time member, and also of the small Free Democrat party. He had a distinguished career in the federal civil service before being appointed President of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development in 1998 and then Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund in 2000. His doctorate is in economics and he has no legal qualifications. 13 In contrast to most Federal Presidents, his involvement in politics prior to his election was very minor, but he was also not, by any stretch of the imagination, a popular figure.
The Federal President's power to assent to Bills is found in the first sentence of art 82(1) of the Basic Law, which runs as follows:
Laws enacted in accordance with the provisions of this Basic Law shall, after countersignature [by the Federal Chancellor or the responsible Federal Minister under art 58], be certified by the Federal President and promulgated in the Federal Law Gazette. 14 
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Article 63 of the Basic Law, which provides that the Federal President proposes, but the Bundestag disposes. In particular, if the former's nominee is not elected by the latter, it may elect another candidate of its own choosing. ' Laws' is in the original -it does not say 'Bills' or 'proposed laws'. 15 Under art 93(1)(1) of the Basic Law and § § 13(5) and 63 of the Federal Constitutional Court Act (Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz) , it is possible for the government or a House of Parliament 16 to sue the Federal President 17 in cases in which he has refused to sign a law, seeking (to use familiar terminology) a declaration 18 that his refusal was a breach of his duties. 19 This potential has never been realised at any time since it was created in 1949. It might be thought to involve some slight stretching of the words of art 93(1)(1), which speaks of the 'rights and duties' of chief organs of the state including the Federal President. It sounds a bit odd to speak of what we might rather conceive as the power to grant assent as either a right or a duty, but the statement in art 82(1) that laws 'shall' be certified by the Federal President is taken as imposing a duty on him to sign. 20 
_____________________________________________________________________________________
translations of other portions of the Basic Law quoted in the text. The reason for relying on the official text in this case appears shortly.
15
In this context only, this sloppiness might be defended (but, as far as I am aware, is not in Germany) on the grounds that assent to a Bill 'converts it into an Act, uno ictu': I C Harris (ed) However, the quoted portion of art 82(1) also states that the obligation to assent arises only if a Bill is 'enacted in accordance with the provisions of the Basic Law'. This frankness with which a formal legal duty to sign laws is imposed upon the head of state is less surprising in a republic in which the head of state is merely another official, albeit the highest in terms of protocol, rather than the sacrosanct figure of royalty on which formal legal, as distinct from conventional, duties are rarely imposed.
The word translated above as 'certified' is ausgefertigt. It is clear enough that the process connoted by this word includes a check that the law to which assent is about to be given has in fact been passed by Parliament in the form in which it is presented for assent. 21 Thus, the word is translated above, and generally understood to mean, 'certified'. But is there anything else that must be 'certified' -for example, that the proposed law has been 'enacted in accordance with the provisions of this Basic Law'? If so, is this a reference merely to the machinery provisions about legislative procedure in art 78, 22 or does it include some or all other parts of the Basic Law? For example, is the Federal President required to certify that a statute is within federal legislative powers, or even that it is not an infringement of the charter of rights?
Immediately we run into the difficulty that in constitutional law ausgefertigt is not a technical term with a more or less fixed and well-known meaning (unlike our word 'assent', but rather like some other terms in Australian constitutional law such as 'excise'). Ausgefertigt, a past participle, became established rather late as a designation of what has occurred to a law when assent is given to it by a chief executive: its first use was in the Constitution of the North German Confederation of 1867. 23 The word used in earlier German constitutions for the same process was promulgiert, or some variant on it. 24 Promulgiert is obviously related to a well-known English word, itself of Latin origin, but in the second half of the nineteenth century it was common to look for more 'German sounding' words for legal concepts -an approach which may also be seen at work in the Civil Code of 1896 and which is also probably responsible for ausgefertigt. The replacement of well-understood terms by new inventions did not always do much for assisting understanding of the law, either on the part of its
See eg, Mewing, above n 18, 18; Hallier, above n 17, 398; Schack, 'Prüfungszuständigkeit' above n 9, 89.
22
There are also equivalent passages in arts 81(2)(1) and 115d(2)(3), and these would also be included, as is pointed out by Michael Brenner, in Hermann von Mangoldt, Friedrich Klein and Christian Starck (eds), Kommentar zum Grundgesetz (2005) vol 2, 2359; Lücke, above n 20, 1688. However, as the two named emergency provisions have never been used, they will not be mentioned again.
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In art 17, where the equivalent noun Ausfertigung was used. See Hartmut Maurer, in Rudolf Dolzer et al (eds), Bonner Kommentar zum Grundgesetz (2006) art 82, 9; Heinz Herbert Weigt, Das Recht des Reichspräsidenten zur Prüfung der Gesetze (1933) 7. The latter mentions the Bavarian Constitution of 1818 as using the word as well. That Constitution certainly uses Ausfertigung and ausgefertigt but not, as I read it, in relation to assent to laws especially. As far as I can see, not being an expert on this long-since-superseded document, Titel VII § 30 is the provision on that topic, and it uses the word sanctioniert ('sanctions') to describe the process. Weigt states, however, that ausgefertigt gradually became established with the meaning of 'signed' thereafter, and that Ausfertigung first appeared with the modern meaning in constitutional law in the 1867 North German Constitution. 24 Hallier, above n 17, 394.
professional interpreters or that of the public. As late as 1918, a book 25 appeared with the chapter heading 'Die Ausfertigung (Promulgation)' as if people might not be entirely sure what the newer, more German-sounding word meant without an explanation in terms of the older but less German-sounding one.
In the civil law, the equivalent noun Ausfertigung can mean the preparation of a certified copy of a judgment, for example for the purposes of execution, or by a familiar result-for-condition metonymy 26 the resulting copy itself; but it cannot have that meaning in constitutional law, where of course the copy of a Bill that has been ausgefertigt by the Federal President is the authentic copy of the resulting statute. 27 The -fertigt part of the word suggests mere finishing off or making ready, as by the production of a clean copy -fertig is the German word for 'finished' or 'ready' -but it is not obvious what enhancement or change in this meaning is implied by the addition of aus-. 28 Like Greek, German has a considerable capacity to create new verbs by the addition of a particle, often originally a preposition, to a stem; but sometimes, as here, the preposition added is used in ways which are not perspicuous.
Surprising as it may seem, it is the majority view among German scholars that the Federal President in certifying laws must ensure that they surmount all constitutional hurdles, up to and including the charter of rights. But before looking at the scholars' views in more detail, let us first see what has actually been done by Federal Presidents over the years.
THE CASES
There are now nine cases in which the Federal President has finally refused to assent to a Bill. Professor Friedrich Schoch of the Law School of the University of Freiburg 51 but other experts had also publicly denied the constitutionality of the proposal. 52 The government was said by 'informed sources' to be annoyed that the Federal President had declared his own opinion to be obviously right when the government was of a different view. 53 • Case 9: 54 In the final case to date, which occurred on 8 December 2006, the Basic Law had just (on 1 September 2006) been amended to add a paragraph to art 84(1) which says, 'Tasks may not be assigned by means of federal laws to local authorities or associations of local authorities'. 55 This was done in order to prevent the federal legislature from declaring costly tasks to be the responsibility of local authorities, as it had had a propensity to do -without making any or sufficient financial provision for their discharge. 56 A government Bill dealing with the provision of information to consumers proposed to require local authorities to provide information about products to consumers. 57 Again, doubts about the constitutionality of this Bill were expressed during the legislative process, and in the Bundesrat, Berlin's representatives voted against it for that reason. 58 The found himself for the second time in about six weeks refusing to assent to a Bill. He rejected a reading down of the Bill designed to save it, under which the local authorities' duty under it would arise only when they also actually had governmental responsibility for the subject in relation to which they held information.
There followed an unmistakable shot across the presidential bows from the government. 60 German newspapers learnt, somehow or other, that thought had been given within the government to bringing the first-ever suit against the Federal President for a declaration that a refusal to assent was legally baseless 61 -a possibility that had been immediately, expressly and officially rejected in the previous case 62 -but this idea was apparently abandoned. Instead, a new statute was assented to by the Federal President on 5 November 2007 which contained a special paragraph reflecting the view he had put forward in refusing assent to the initial Bill and stating that local authorities had duties under the Act only if given them by a State statute. 63 • Case 10: There is one other case of non-assent to a Bill in the history of the Federal Republic, 64 anomalous because it occurred in accordance with the wishes of the government. On 18 June 1953, while the anti-communist revolt in eastern Germany was being brutally suppressed, the Bill concerned was passed by the Bundestag at a time before the party system had settled and accordingly non-government Bills still had a fighting chance of success. The Bill purported to provide an amnesty to publishers, journalists and civil servants who had committed certain crimes; the principal beneficiary was intended to be a journalist, one Dr Platow, who was alleged to have breached secrecy and bribery legislation in order to come by information for his 'insiders' newsletter. For pre-1949 cases, see above n 30. I disregard these because constitutional arrangements were significantly different and not comparable.
signature being a step which, under art 82(1) as quoted above, occurs before a Bill is presented to the Federal President, and which is equivalent in function to formal advice to sign it. 66 Thus the Bill was never presented to the Federal President. A revised statute was thereupon prepared, received assent and was later upheld by the Federal Constitutional Court. 67 This summary shows that assent has been refused in relation to Bills of various types for various types of alleged constitutional infringements. In cases 1, 3 and 10 the objection was based on the charter of rights; in cases 4, 5 and 9 the division of responsibilities among the constituent parts of the federation was said to have been infringed -in the first two cases the subject-matter did not appear on the federal list, while in case 9 there was an express prohibition of the exercise of federal powers in a particular fashion. Cases 2 and 6 involved non-compliance with required legislative procedures, in both cases the need for the consent of the States' House, the Bundesrat, so that these two cases also had some federalist aspect. Cases 7 and 8 involved constitutional provisions about the structure of federal administration with no 'federalism flavour'.
As far as the degree of certainty with which a constitutional infringement could be identified is concerned, in cases 2, 4 and 5 more or less direct support was available for the Federal President's view from the decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court, the final arbiter of constitutionality. In the other cases no such direct support existed. In case 1 the Reich President went out on something of a limb to support his old friends in the army. In case 9 the provision was so new that no support from Court decisions could reasonably have been expected; the decision was reasonably well founded, although by no means an unarguable case precisely because the provision was very new. In case 10 the government itself considered the Bill unconstitutional. In cases 3, 6, 7 and 8 the Federal President's view certainly seemed right, but of course the governments which proposed the Bills argued for a more 'sophisticated' understanding of the constitutional provisions concerned, and in case 7 also unsuccessfully alleged necessity.
In addition to these cases, various other incidents have occurred over the years in which it has been urged that constitutional problems exist with a statute, and it should not be assented to by the Federal President. 68 Perhaps the most controversial of these occurred in 2002, when a new law on immigration was proposed by the governing federal Social Democrat/Green coalition and ran into considerable opposition from many conservatives. When the Bill reached the Bundesrat, the government of the State of Brandenburg, then ruled by a Social Democrat/conservative coalition, was unable to agree on how to cast its Bundesrat votes. Each State has a certain number of votes depending on its population, but all the votes of a State must be cast on one side of a question. 69 But when the vote was taken, the Social Democrat Minister cast his vote for yes, while the conservative Deputy Premier, Army Inspector-General (ret'd) Jörg Schönbohm, cast his vote for no. When the procedure was repeated because of this irregularity, the Social Democrat Premier, Manfred Stolpe, indicated that the State voted yes, while Schönbohm said, 'Sie kennen meine Auffassung, Herr Präsident!' ('You know my opinion, Mr President!'). 70 Only with Brandenburg's votes did the law pass the Bundesrat.
The view of the majority of constitutional scholars was that this was a clear case of invalidity: Brandenburg's votes could not be counted at all as they were not unanimous. However, the Federal President -Johannes Rau, a former Social Democrat State Premier -signed the Bill after just over two months' delay, referring to the fact that the consequences of a non-unanimous vote were not clear because there was no case law on the issue and academics were not agreed (when are they ever?). In doing so, Rau deferred to the primacy of the Court in deciding disputed points of constitutional law and disclaimed any party-political motive. 71 While not everyone was able to take this at face value given the coincidence between the former party membership of the Federal President and that of the government that had put forward the disputed Bill, when the Federal Constitutional Court held the law invalid 72 there were two dissenting Judges, which justified the Federal President's stance. Rau later published a defence of his decision in which he explained that he had sought external legal advice (although he gave no details of this) and lamented the political controversy which even the suggestion of a possible veto of the Bill had created for his non-party-political office. 73 One further case is worthy of mention under the heading of 'near misses'. When a Bill on the private law liability of the state (not just the federal States, but including them) was passed in the early 1980s severe doubts were entertained about its constitutionality, as the federation could at that time rely only on its general power over civil law to enact such a statute. This did not seem sufficient -and indeed, the Federal Constitutional Court did in fact eventually decide that the statute was invalid. 74 There was also a question whether the Bill needed the endorsement of the Bundesrat. But assent was given by Federal President Professor Karl Carstens -a former professor of constitutional law 75 who had been proposed for the office by the conservative Christian Democrats. He is the author of the book referred to above n 39.
In a letter to the Federal Chancellor, 76 Carstens stated that he had 'considerable doubts' 77 about the constitutionality of the legislation, but had been advised by the Home Secretary and the Minister of Justice that it was constitutional, and it could not be denied that their arguments had 'a certain weight'. He said further that he believed he would be justified in not signing only if the lack of constitutionality were 'obvious and beyond doubt'. He also referred to the fact that the law could reach the Federal Constitutional Court only if he signed it -which is of course obvious; but this pays no regard to the possibility that a refusal to assent on his part might be followed by a suit for a declaration that he was wrong not to sign because the Act would have been valid. However, a professor of constitutional law would hardly have failed to notice this point -so we may take it that this statement was actually an oblique means of indicating which course he thought preferable, in which case it is easy to understand his view. 78 There are in addition two cases in which the Premier of Bavaria -who assents to State laws for lack of any supra-party figurehead at State level equivalent to an Australian State Governor -has also refused to assent to a Bill because he doubted its constitutionality. In the first case, in 1957, the State Premier (in a letter which suggests strongly that he had had legal advice) stated that a proposed State law amending the law reconstituting courts with financial jurisdiction had not received his assent because it either attempted to alter a law which had since been deemed 79 to have become a federal statute and was thus not within State power, or because it would be inconsistent with a provision of the Basic Law itself. 80 In the second case, which related to a law about beer proposed in 1964, the Premier expressly stated that he had received legal advice to the effect that there were federal constitutional problems with the proposal and that it was also inconsistent with certain ordinary federal laws that took precedence and would invalidate the proposed State legislation. 81 In both these cases therefore, the refusal to assent was justified for reasons going beyond the merely procedural steps in Parliament. There was no discussion in the published announcements of the refusals to assent of the extent to which the legal opinions received permitted doubts about the conclusions they reached. It was not suggested that serious doubts existed.
I have not found any references to any such action in any other State. It is possible that further incidents along those lines might have occurred, as State constitutional law is not always well documented, but these two Bavarian cases are curiosities and may be unique. Refusals of assent by State Premiers are likely to be extremely rare, as the State Premier is almost always also in command of a majority in the State legislature. 
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Volume 36 ____________________________________________________________________________________ (All State legislatures now have one chamber, although at that point Bavaria still had two.) In some other States, sometimes other officers are entrusted with the task, 82 but they too are likely to be closely connected with the majority party in the legislature.
SCHOLARS' VIEWS
Scholars have attempted to impose some order on the data just summarised and to interpret the wording of art 82 under which the Federal President's assent is required, but have been far from unanimous. 83 The question on which scholars traditionally divide is whether procedural errors are the only errors that may be taken into account, or there is something further besides. The narrow view is that there is not. The broad view is that there is no restriction to procedural errors only. Under this view, the Federal President can refuse to sign Bills in all other cases of constitutional invalidity, such as when the charter of rights is breached. A middle view is that all non-material defects other than the content-based restrictions of the charter of rights can be a ground for non-assent; this includes not merely parliamentary procedure but also the existence of legislative competence in the federation as distinct from the States (cases 4, 5 and 9) and standalone restrictions such as those in cases 7 and 8. 84 The broad view of course includes all those cases as well because it allows for non-assent in all cases of constitutional invalidity.
Supporters of all views agree that errors in legislative procedure justify non-assent if the resulting statute would be invalid because of the error. This conclusion is based on the reference in art 82(1) of the Basic Law 85 to the certification of laws that have been enacted 'in accordance with the provisions of this Basic Law', and the prescription in art 78 of the ways in which the legislative process within Parliament operates. 86 It is virtually unanimously concluded that the words just quoted from art 82(1) mean to refer back to the provisions of art 78. Supporters of the narrow view assume this reference exhausts the concept of certification, 87 while supporters of the broad view say that it is not clear enough to achieve that result. There is a parallel dispute in relation to the Ausfertigung of State laws. In Germany there is no apolitical State figurehead comparable to the Federal President to do this, so the State Constitutions give the task variously to the State Premier, the Cabinet or the president of the legislature. The arguments are nevertheless very similar to those in the federal sphere and are summarised in ibid 87-90. 84 Mewing, above n 18, 18. The generally accepted definition of procedural errors in legislation which the Federal President may take into account as part of this process includes situations in which it is uncertain whether the consent of the Bundesrat to a Bill is required and it has not in fact been granted. 88 In other words, procedural errors include choosing wrongly among the various procedures in the first place and thus wrongly assuming that the Bundesrat's consent is not required, even if the chosen procedure is then correctly carried out, as in cases 2 and 6. As the rules about when the Bundesrat must consent can be quite complicated, this is an important point.
What has been said in the preceding two paragraphs exhausts the agreement among scholars. The courts have never dealt with the question whether the broad, middle or narrow view is correct, and thus there is no relevant case law 89 to speak of. 90 The drafting history of art 82(1), and its predecessors' history before 1949, also contribute nothing to the resolution of this question. The drafters of any of the constitutions in which the word ausgefertigt or its noun Ausfertigung is used simply did not debate the question of its meaning publicly. 91 As we saw earlier, the word ausgefertigt is also quite unhelpful as a matter of ordinary semantics. 92 As far as the federal constitutional structure is concerned, it is notable that it expressly confers the function of judicial review on the Federal Constitutional Court (art 93(1)(4a)). The text also states that other courts may not declare laws invalid (art 100(1)). However, it does not extend this prohibition to other constitutional _____________________________________________________________________________________ 88 Most commentators assume that this is so, if they do not expressly state it (as does for example Nierhaus, 'Nochmals', above n 19, 235). Even the most determined supporter of the narrow view agreed (Friesenhahn, above n 9, 685). Only rarely does one come across an argument such as that in Heinz Mayer, B-VG: Kurzkommentar (3rd ed, 2002) 201 (Austria): the President should check whether the constitutional procedure that was deemed applicable was complied with, but not whether the right procedure was chosen.
89
The common law concept of case law is not out of place in this area, as § 31 of the Federal Constitutional Court Act provides that the decisions of that Court bind all constitutional organs and in some circumstances also 'have the force of law'.
90
The only exception is a brief obiter dictum of the Hessian State Constitutional Court apparently supporting the broad view. But it is not only a brief obiter dictum; it also dates from 1950, is unsupported by reasons, was uninformed by post-1949 experience and deals with a State constitution only: decision of 4 August 1950 by the Hessian State Constitutional Court under the Hessian State Constitution, which I have read in full in Beilage Nr. 7 zum 'Hessischen Staatsanzeiger' 1950, 41-4, and which is also recorded in JZ 1951, 244 sub 2(b). Sometimes BVerfGE 1, 396, 412; 2, 143, 169; 34, 9, 22-3 are cited as relevant case law, eg, by Brenner, above n 22, 2360. But these cases contain old dicta (the latest is from 1972); the point was not directly raised in them; the dicta state that the Federal President has some function of checking the constitutionality of laws presented to him for assent, but the Court does not even consider precisely how far that function extends, or attempt to determine whether what I call the narrow, the middle or the broad view is correct. Cf Paul Glauben, 'Das Prüfungsrecht des Bundespräsidenten' DriZ 2007, 38, 38-9; Hederich, above n 86, 125; Jekewitz, above n 20, 13; Maurer, above n 23, art 82, 16. Of even less use is BVerfGE 7, 330, 337, also sometimes cited, for reasons which appear on reading the passage concerned. 91 Mewing, above n 18, 58; Weigt, above n 23, 9. 
Federal Law Review
Volume 36 ____________________________________________________________________________________ organs. 93 Nevertheless, this might be seen as a broad hint to them, as clearly the intention is to have a central body charged with the task of judicial review. After all, questions relating to whether a statute is valid, especially under value-laden provisions such as a charter of rights, can be very dependent on individual assessments, so that it is necessary to have one authoritative voice.
But those in favour of the middle or broad views of the Federal President's powers point to other constitutional provisions. For example, references are made to the Federal President's oath to defend the Basic Law, 94 or the possibility of his being accused of neglect of his duties under art 61 for signing a Bill that in fact should not have been signed. The difficulty with this type of argument is that it assumes that which is to be proved, namely that the Federal President does in fact have the duty not to assent to Bills if they conflict with the Basic Law in any respect, rather than leaving the matter to the Court. This is untenable because it begs the question (or, as is often said, because it would turn provisions reinforcing existing duties into provisions creating new duties), 95 a fact which has been realised by most of the supporters of the middle and broad views who have more or less abandoned this argument.
Some supporters of the broad view, however, still refer to the binding nature of rules of the constitutional system (including the charter of rights) on all constitutional organs, as declared in arts 1(3) and 20(3) of the Basic Law, as the basis for a duty in the Federal President, a constitutional organ, to determine whether Bills are in accordance with the Basic Law. 96 But if the better view of the constitution as a whole is that all or some questions of the validity of proposed laws are reserved for the Federal Constitutional Court, these provisions, coupled with the general duty to assent in art 82(1), can mean only that the Federal President is not to refuse assent. Thus, reference to such provisions does not advance the case for the broad view at all, but merely re-phrases the question: does the constitution impose such a duty on the Federal President or not? 97 
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Epping, above n 9, 1106. Furthermore, the Court can take action only after assent, so it could also be argued on that ground that there is no conflict with a power to refuse assent: Nolte and Tams, above n 92, 1089; Schümer, above n 82, 89 (States). 94 Under art 56, the President swears an oath which includes a promise to 'uphold and defend the Basic Law and the laws of the Federation' and to 'conscientiously fulfil my duties'. 95 Bryde, above n 47, 283; Epping, above n 9, 1105; Friauf, above n 12, 550; Friesenhahn, above n 9, 686; Wolfgang Heyde, 'Zum Umfang der materiellen Prüfungskompetenz des Bundespräsidenten' DöV 1971, 797, 798; Dietmar Jahnel, 'Die Mitwirkung des Bundespräsidenten an der Bundesgesetzgebung' JBl 1987, 683, 638; Gerold Lehnguth, 'Die Verweigerung der Ausfertigung von Gesetzen durch den Bundespräsidenten und das weitere Verfahren' DöV 439, 442; Maurer, above n 23, art 82, 19; Mewing, above n 18, 74-5; Nierhaus, Entscheidung, above n 19, 94; Nierhaus, 'Nochmals', above n 19, 240-1; Nolte and Tams, above n 92, 1089; Pohl, above n 18, 136; Rau, above n 73, 564; Riedel and Schmidt, above n 45, 372-3; Rode, above n 27, 64. Schümer, above n 82, 88 makes the same point at State level. 96 Bauer, above n 12, 1904; Brenner, above n 22, 2361; Karl-Heinrich Hall, 'Überlegungen zur Prüfungskompetenz des Bundespräsidenten' JZ 1965, 305, 306; Lehnguth, above n 95, 442; Nierhaus, Entscheidung, above n 19, 65-6, 104; Pohl, above n 18, 145, 149; Rau, above n 73, 564; Schümer, above n 82, 89-90, 93 (States). 97 Bryde, above n 47, 283; Friauf, above n 12, 559-60; Hederich, above n 86, 132-3; Maurer, above n 23, art 82, 19; Nolte and Tams, above n 92, 1089.
In fact the provisions mentioned retard the case for all but the narrowest view: if those articles did mean, as is sometimes said, that the Federal President breaches the Basic Law if he signs Bills which breach it, and is thus bound to refuse assent in all cases of unconstitutionality, then of course the Federal President has breached the Basic Law on all those occasions on which he has signed Bills which were later found to be invalid by the Court. 98 While the Federal President would not be in deliberate breach of the Basic Law in cases where he was mistakenly of the view that a Bill was in fact valid, an interpretation should not be lightly adopted which implies that the head of state has been guilty of umpteen reckless 99 or negligent breaches of the constitution by doing what he conceived to be his duty.
Rather, the fidelity to law which a Rechtsstaat demands does not exclude the possibility that an organ of the constitution must participate in an activity which it considers unlawful if the law appoints another exclusive means of resolving the question. 100 Take for example a judge who fervently believes that constitutional law does not permit the exercise of power by his or her court in a particular matter. We should expect that judge nevertheless to bow to the final contrary decision of the question by the highest court and exercise that jurisdiction anyway.
Furthermore, the blunderbuss view that giving assent to an invalid law is ipso facto a breach of presidential duty is not well adapted for cases in which only one part of a Bill is thought to be invalid. As there is no power to assent to part only of a Bill, 101 many supporters of the middle and broad views state that the Federal President can refuse to sign a Bill only if it is wholly invalid, 102 while some others say that it depends on things like the proportion of valid to invalid portions and the seriousness of the breach. 103 Either opinion gives the game away, 104 because it implies that the Federal President will sometimes be required to breach his duty. The Basic Law, if a coherent system of constitutional norms, cannot mean to put the Federal President in the position of being 'damned if he does and damned if he doesn't'. 102 Biehl, above n 19, 114; Lehnguth, above n 95, 443; Mewing, above n 18, 77-9; Nierhaus, 'Nochmals', above n 19, 249. Obviously, if it were the true position that any valid clause could save a whole Bill, 'tacking' would be rewarded: the government could deliberately add a certainly valid provision to an otherwise doubtful Bill, and claim the right to have it assented to as a result. On the other hand, if only one detail of a Bill is doubtful there might be any number of good reasons for letting it through so that the point can be finally determined and the rest of the provisions are not held up as a result of a problem that is trifling when considered as a proportion of the whole. Case 9 may be an example of this. 103 Herzog, above n 19, 610; Heyde, above n 95, 800; Maurer, above n 23, art 82, 22; Pohl, above n 18, 193. 104 As do authors like Lehnguth, above n 95, 443, who rely on the argument that the subjection of the Federal President to the rules of constitutional law means that he should not sign unconstitutional laws, only to go on and add that he may nevertheless decide to do so for tactical reasons.
Surprisingly enough, however, the 'principal argument' 105 for the broad view is none of those considered so far. It is based on the Jesuitical view that there is no distinction between errors relating to legislative procedure and other errors. The argument (which was first formulated at the time of the Weimar Republic) 106 starts with the proposition that a law which infringes the other parts of the Basic Law, apparently unrelated to legislative procedures, is a law which must necessarily also contain an error relating to legislative procedure. This is because art 79(1) requires all laws altering the Basic Law to state expressly an intention to alter the constitution. 107 A Bill that is in conflict with, for example, the basic right to freedom of occupation, as in case 3, is therefore taken by the proponents of this argument as an unsuccessful attempt to amend the Basic Law to permit the infraction of the right concerned, and as failing because of an error in legislative procedure, namely the failure to state an intention to amend the Basic Law. This is unconvincing, because that is not the intention of the Bill at all. A Bill's proponents will not argue, and given the prohibition of implied amendments could not rationally argue, that they are putting forward a Bill inconsistent with the Basic Law. Their case will not be that they forgot to ensure that a provision for express amendment of the Basic Law was needed; their case is rather that no such provision is needed at all, because the law is not inconsistent with the Basic Law (and should therefore receive assent in its present form). 108 The argument therefore confuses the real defect in the Bill (assuming that there is one) with the means by which it might be fixed -which are not the same thing precisely because of the prohibition on implied amendments. 109 Putting the same point from a different angle: it is not the case that implied amendments are permitted only if a special procedure is followed. Rather, they are entirely prohibited, and that is for substantive reasons, namely their misuse under the Weimar Constitution; any law which would otherwise achieve an implied amendment suffers from a substantive and not a procedural defect. 110 Sometimes it is also argued that procedural and non-procedural matters are inextricably mixed because different procedures are prescribed for different types of laws: for example, some require the consent of the Bundesrat, while in other cases its objections can be overridden. A Bill's categorisation depends on its contents. Thus, it is said, it is not possible to determine the correct procedure for any Bill without looking beyond procedural matters, and the distinction is lost. It is certainly true that procedures vary according to content, but this does not mean that there is no such _____________________________________________________________________________________ 105 Biehl, above n 19, 113. Others to put forward this argument include Maunz, above n 65, art 82, 2; Nierhaus, Entscheidung, above n 19, 98-99; Schneider, above n 12, 277; Wild, above n 19, 58-60. 106 Anschütz, above n 33, 368; Arndt, above n 31, 605. 107 In relation to the States, Schümer, above n 82, 89, refers to two States with similar provisions prohibiting implied amendments in relation to which the same arguments pertain, but does not go on to tell us about the other fourteen. The federal rule is also a point of distinction with the Weimar Constitution, which did not prohibit implied amendments: Nierhaus, Entscheidung, above n 19, 96-7; Pohl, above n 18, 134; Rode, above n 27, 55-7. 108 Epping, above n 9, 1106; Hederich, above n 86, 125-6, 136. 109 Riedel and Schmidt, above n 45, 373. See also Heyde, above n 95, 798. 110 Rode, above n 27, 56-7.
thing as a 'purely' procedural error. There is surely still a difference between not seeking the consent of the Bundesrat because of a mistaken view about whether that is required -even a mistaken view based on a view about the content of the proposed law -and carrying out the procedures flawlessly for a Bill that infringes a basic right. Determining the correct procedure is as much a matter relating to legislative procedure, even if the classification of the Bill based on its content is a criterion, as following the correct procedure once it is determined what that is. 111 Finally, the supporters of the middle and broad views refer to the fact that the Federal President can be sued for not assenting, and thus refusal can never prevent the issue coming before the Federal Constitutional Court. Furthermore, proponents of a vetoed law who are serious about its constitutionality, and are not merely prepared to assert its constitutionality to the Federal President as a means of bludgeoning a signature out of him, can 'put their money where their mouth is'.
This in itself may well be a good thing, although it does not entail the correctness of the broad view: it shows merely that, if the broad view is correct, the usurpation of the Court's role and the consequent flagrant inconsistency with the constitutional design can be avoided by use of this mechanism -not that the broad view actually is correct. The decision not to assent is not taken in a political vacuum. It would hardly be wise for a Federal President to provoke a stream of suits against himself by the government, and this possibility does not equate to a blank cheque to refuse to sign whenever doubts are entertained. Losses before the Court would bring the office into disrepute, and constant refusals, even if unchallenged or unsuccessfully challenged, would make the office appear too political. 112 As Federal President Rau discovered in the Immigration Bill case, even suggestions that refusal might be contemplated 113 lead to inevitable press stories involving uninformed speculation masquerading as inside information and even gross misunderstandings of the basics of the political system and the law -in short, to considerable controversy, something of course which is meat and drink for the press and helps to sell newspapers but is not ideal for an office which is meant to be above party politics. Nor would it be fair to politicians to require them to take action against the head of state every time a law may be invalid. 114 There is therefore no good reason to accept the broad view that any error in enacting a Bill which would make the resulting statute invalid justifies a refusal of assent. _____________________________________________________________________________________ 111 Maurer, above n 23, art 82, 18-19. 112 Bryde, above n 47, 289; Friauf, above n 12, 563, 565. However, Pohl, above n 18, 159-60, points out that citizens nowadays can generally be expected to cope with the idea that there will be occasional differences of opinion about the correct legal answer to a question, and thus loss of prestige is not inevitable. 113 Pace Christian Lutze, 'Ein präsidiales Mißverständnis über die formelle Prüfungskompentenz' NVwZ 2003, 323, 325, the involvement of the office in political speculation began not when Herr Rau eventually signed the law, but rather as a result of speculation and suggestions that he should not -in other words, because the power existed. 114 Mewing, above n 18, 28.
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THE EMERGING PRACTICE
A writer on this very topic has noted that 'legal scholarship and practical politics traditionally follow rather separate paths in Germany'. 115 At least in this field, this is less true than it once was. Scholars have increasingly come to realise that it is not so much the source of constitutional error, but the certainty with which it can be stated that an error has indeed occurred that is decisive. 116 So has the Federal President, as the cases analysed above indicate. 117 This takes account of the need to have one authority, that of the Court, in all but the most obvious cases; and indeed the debate has changed as arguments left over from the days of the Weimar Republic, when judicial review was very restricted, 118 have been gradually abandoned as judicial review has become established and extensively practised in post-War Germany. 119 Thus we nowadays find passionate scholarly defences of the broad view as the only reasonable one, the view that enjoys the greater number of adherents in academic discussion -as indeed it does 120 -and necessary because otherwise a blank cheque will exist for the disregard of constitutional law by the legislature. This statement however is regularly followed by the somewhat lame qualification that assent should, of course, be refused only when it is quite certain that a constitutional obstacle does in fact exist. 121 Equally, the supporters of the narrow view defend their position on the grounds that the Federal President has no business usurping the functions of the Court, and art 82(1), properly interpreted, does not permit him to do so because it refers only to errors in legislative procedure -but then they typically also add that of course a refusal to assent should take place only in clear cases, and additionally that, if the free 120 It thus has the coveted status of herrschende Meinung or prevalent opinion (among academics that is -although that is more important in a civil law country). For statements that it is the hM see, eg, Friauf, above n 12, 548-9 (pointing out that reasoning differs even among supporters of the hM); Friesenhahn, above n 9, 680, 692; Hall, above n 96, 306; Herzog, above n 19, 605; Heyde, above n 95, 797; Riedel and Schmidt, above n 45, 372; Rode, above n 27, 11-12. 121 Brenner, above n 22, 2361; Herzog, above n 19, 605, 609. democratic order were ever in real danger, the Federal President would be justified in refusing to assent to a Bill no matter what its subject matter. 122 This addition is sometimes justified by reference to art 20(4) of the Basic Law, which states that all Germans (including, of course, the Federal President) have a general right, if no other means are available, to resist attempts to do away with the constitutional system established by the Basic Law. 123 The historical background to this provision is too notorious to require spelling out.
Some supporters of the narrow view were no doubt attracted to it by the idea that the existence of procedural errors in Parliament is likely to be less controversial than errors relating to the charter of rights or the distribution of legislative powers. 124 But, as the Immigration Bill case of 2002 and the various cases involving the Bundesrat show, it is by no means inevitable that all procedural errors will be clear-cut. The supporters of this view too therefore tend towards the practical criterion of certainty.
A particularly notable case of the shift from category-based arguments to the question whether invalidity is clear is provided by Professor Carstens, the former professor of constitutional law who became Federal President. As a professor he had expressed himself in favour of the narrow view, but even then he added that there would be an exception for Bills which endangered the free democratic system. When it came to the crunch, he based his decision to assent to the State Liability Bill not on category-based grounds, but rather on the grounds that the Bill was arguably constitutional! 125 There are one or two other considerations that might be decisive in borderline or unlikely cases. In summary form, they are: whether the Bill would work any irretrievable damage to democracy or the rule of law; whether the whole purpose of the Bill is invalid (as in case 8) or merely a detail (case 9); whether the constitutional breach by the legislature is deliberate; 126 and also whether there is anyone who is likely to challenge the Bill and will have standing to do so. 127 In cases in which only part of a law is said to be invalid, the proportion of valid to invalid portions must also be of relevance -although if case 9 becomes accepted as a precedent to be followed, which perhaps it may not be, it is clear that even a small proportion of invalidity may prove fatal.
In fact there is no opposition at all between the criterion of obviousness and that of seriousness, but rather an underlying congruence. If the government proposes and the legislature passes legislation which is almost certainly in conflict with the constitution, _____________________________________________________________________________________ 122 Friauf, above n 12, 567; Hederich, above n 86, 135-7; Jahnel, above n 95, 639-40 (Austria).
Nierhaus, 'Nochmals', above n 19, 248-9, makes a similar point although a supporter of the broad view. 123 Bryde, above n 47, 282-3; Hederich, above n 86, 136-7. 124 For example, Kimminch, above n 36, 85, although he also shows awareness of the limitations of this rule of thumb. Whether there is a real difference between charters of rights and other provisions in this respect has recently been the subject of a thoughtful article: Adrienne Stone, 'Judicial Review without Rights: Some Problems for the Democratic Legitimacy of Structural Judicial Review' (2008) 28 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1. I do not mean to imply that I take the same view as Professor Stone, but clearly there is a lot in what she says. 125 Carstens, above n 39, 103-4. 126 Hederich, above n 86, 140; Pohl, above n 18, 181-3. 127 Maurer, above n 23, art 82, 22-3.
that is a really serious thing in itself because it jeopardises the sense that even the government and the legislature are bound by constitutional provisions. In other words, the principle of the rule of law is endangered -not quite as dramatically as democracy would be endangered by a law banning all opposition parties, for example, but rather more insidiously.
Now that it has become clear that the principal criterion is that of certainty, it should moreover be explicitly recognised that the power to refuse assent is a discretion to be exercised with sound judgment and in accordance with the individual circumstances of the case, and is not to be confined to one criterion for its exercise. 128 There is, after all, no statement in any constitutional text of the criteria which would bind the Federal President. 129 There are substantial reasons for thinking that such considerations are already taken into account. Thus for example in case 3 a substantial delay in reaching an inevitable decision was partly prompted by the imminence of an election, and one also has the feeling in relation to cases of doubtful assent such as the State Liability Bill or the Immigration Bill of 2002 that strategic considerations and a desire to avoid controversy played a significant role in the decision to assent. One shudders to think of the controversy that would have enveloped the office of Federal President had its holder in 2002 refused assent to the Immigration Bill rather than referring the issue to the courts by granting it.
The decision whether or not to assent is partly a political one in the broad sensenot just a legal one. It is easy to imagine political circumstances, perhaps involving an imminent election in which a Bill will be at the centre of attention, when it might be unwise to refuse assent to it because doing so would simply ensure that the office of Federal President would be dragged into political controversy.
One other peculiarity relating to the two cases from 2006 also illustrates the relevance of broad political considerations. In that year, as still at the time of writing, what is known as a grand coalition was in power federally. This means a conservative/Social Democrat coalition -in other words, a coalition of the two largest parties in Parliament, the principal parties of the left and right. The opposition was therefore unusually weak because it included only the smaller parties. At the time of writing, the largest of the three opposition parties, the Free Democrats, had sixty-one of the 614 seats in the Bundestag, the 'hard' left party fifty-three and the Greens fiftyone. The unusual weakness of the opposition created a particular need for strong extraparliamentary mechanisms for ensuring the accountability of government. In defending the Federal President's actions in case 9, Professor Schoch did indeed argue that the last thing that our constitutionally governed state needs when there is a grand coalition with a two-thirds majority [in Parliament, ie having power to amend the constitution] is a Federal President who, in exercising his powers under the first sentence of art 82(1) … turns a blind eye to things and is conspicuous by his reluctance to make decisions. 130 In 1969, the previous year in which two Bills were passed but not assented to, the only other grand coalition of the right and left that has existed in post-War German history was also in power. The current Federal President, Dr Köhler, has drawn attention to himself in the environment of a grand coalition not merely by refusing assent to two Bills, but also by his occasional stretching of the boundaries of comment within which a Federal President is normally confined (as a matter of practice, not law) -although one commentator in a legal journal has recently written that nevertheless his conduct 'has lived up to the classical doctrine of Walter Bagehot, the great political writer, who restricted the rights of the head of state in a parliamentary system to the right to warn, encourage and be consulted'. 131
ASSESSMENT AND COMPARISON
Reference was made in the introduction to a comparable case of refusal for invalidity in Victoria in the 1850s. The equivalent question first arose in the newly-established Commonwealth of Australia in a case in which even the Attorney-General considered a Bill invalid according to the then-current doctrine of the High Court of Australiabut nevertheless advised the Governor-General to assent to the Bill on the grounds that it was not for him or the Governor-General to determine its validity, but rather for 'the High Court and the High Court alone'. 132 Any action by the head of state to veto the Bill, even in accordance with ministerial advice, on the grounds that it was outside the powers of the Commonwealth would, he thought, be 'to usurp the functions of the High Court.' 133 In 1906, at the high point of pre-Engineers doctrine in Australia, 134 the Court did indeed hold invalid much of the passage in question in the resulting legislation 135 -but, in a striking demonstration of the aptness of the AttorneyGeneral's view, the Court overruled itself fourteen years later in the Engineers Case, 136 with the result that the passage in question 137 remained on the statute books without great alteration for decades thereafter. Four years after the Engineers Case, the Governor of Tasmania yielded to ministerial advice to assent to Bills that had not passed the State's Legislative Council, although that course was almost certainly constitutionally defective. 138 Shortly afterwards, in The King and His Dominion Governors, Mr Justice Evatt convincingly attacked 19 th century views in favour of an independent right in the Governor to decide upon legal questions. 139 In the result, no Australian Vice-Regal representative nowadays would refuse to wield the Vice-Regal assenting pen even if personally convinced of a Bill's invalidity. Government House is just not the correct forum in which to urge such objections: the courts are.
Sometimes (both in the United Kingdom 140 and in Australia 141 ) it is speculated that the Crown would have the right, perhaps even a duty, to refuse assent to legislation which imperilled the very foundations of democracy, and that may well be true as an abstract proposition. But of course, if such legislation were ever proposed the situation might be like that in Germany in early 1933 in which refusal is less of a practical option than even constitutional theory allows. Fortunately we have no practical examples from either the United Kingdom or Australia to guide our speculations in this area.
Given that they are both figureheads, there is a striking difference in behaviour in the area under discussion between the German Federal President and Australian ViceRegal representatives. The latter have not vetoed Bills for many years, and some writers question nowadays whether they should do so even if in receipt of ministerial advice to that effect. 142 On the other hand, we have seen that in Germany the Federal President has taken it upon himself in no fewer than eight cases since 1949 to differ . It is clear that that case is of very limited value because it occurred at an earlier stage of constitutional government, before the party system had developed and when the Governor still had a reservoir of independent discretion as a result of his connexion with the Colonial Office. The Governor's main reason for refusing the veto was that he would be 'lending [himself] to something little short of a trick upon Parliament' if he did refuse assent because the government had not indicated its objection to Parliament when it was still sitting. I think that nowadays such a pronouncement would seem something of an intervention in day-to-day politics and that no Governor would say that in relation to today's Parliaments, most of which are dominated by the executive.
from the view of 'his' government and veto Bills on the grounds that they are unconstitutional, in his view. While therefore both sets of heads of state 143 disclaim any policy-based role, 144 and the day is probably still far off on which a German Federal President would refuse assent to a Bill for 'mere' reasons of policysomething which would in fact be a breach of the general duty to assent in art 82(1) -the Federal President has created for himself a role as a preliminary check on the constitutionality of legislative proposals alongside that of the Federal Constitutional Court which no Australian Vice-Regal representative would dream of assuming. It would be unduly simplistic to see this difference as nothing more than a reflection of the fact that the one country is a republic, while the other is a monarchy. No Austrian President has ever vetoed a Bill. 145 Thus, our practice will not necessarily change if Australia were to become a republic. Something would of course depend upon the precise arrangements adopted under any proposed republic. A directly elected president might take a more expansive view of his role than an indirectly elected one. From such a person even objections of policy could not be ruled out, unless perhaps the Constitution clearly provided otherwise. But the directly elected Austrian President has not adopted that course. Nor did the directly elected Weimar Reich Presidents, unless one regards case 1 above -involving the ban on duels and the additional punishment for soldiers to which Reich President von Hindenburg objected -as a case in which a policy objection was camouflaged by tendentious legal arguments. Even in that case there is only one exception in fourteen years, and it is significant that camouflage was felt to be required. In the dying days of the Weimar Republic, once Hitler had begun to convert the Weimar Republic into a dictatorship using quasi-legal means, there were plenty of opportunities for similar objections which were not taken -although that certainly had something to do with von Hindenburg's precarious health coupled with the obvious failure of the Weimar democracy and a consequent lack of enthusiasm for defending it.
A lot clearly depends on factors such as the existence of precedents, other features of the constitutional system and even chance, which vary more or less randomly from one legal order to another. For example, if Federal President Heuss had not vetoed a Bill in the early 1950s (case 2), it may well be that the lack of a precedent for vetoing Bills would have deterred all later Federal Presidents. Pointing out that later cases are by no means the first in German constitutional history is an obvious means by which a veto can be defended to the public. But if the possibility of referring a question of law to the Federal Constitutional Court for an advisory opinion had not existed at the time of case 2, quite possibly Heuss would not have dared to take the step he did and the crucial initial precedent would never have been created. If this reasoning is correct the provision for reference to the Court lives on long after its abolition in 1956. Perhaps this is also why the situation in Austria is different: no-one there has ever been brave enough to set the initial precedent. Similarly, in Australia the first precedent set in the early years after Federation was to assent and refer the issue to the courts, and it has been uniformly followed.
Tradition may also have a role to play in a manner which is non-random and permits some useful systematic comparisons about causes and effects. Thus the position of a republican president, even an indirectly elected one, is different in a number of ways from that of a representative of the Crown, even one whose tenure is not hereditary and who may possibly have some degree of recognition by the public (one need only think of people as diverse as Sir William Deane or John Landy). First, there is the obvious systematic difference that the German Federal President has some security of tenure. Under art 61 of the Basic Law, he cannot be removed except by an elaborate procedure involving an accusation by two-thirds of one House of Parliament that he has deliberately violated the law followed by a judgment to that effect by the Federal Constitutional Court. The tenure of an Australian Governor-General or State Governor, on the other hand, is, as far as the formal law is concerned, extraordinarily weak: they hold office formally at Her Majesty's pleasure. Prime Ministers and State Premiers, for a host of good practical and political reasons, have been naturally reluctant to tender advice to Her Majesty to dismiss the Vice-Regal representative for no good reason. But if push comes to shove, as on several occasions in recent times, 146 a contest between the head of government and the Vice-Regal representative is always very likely to be won by the former.
Secondly, the Federal President is indirectly elected in Germany and thus has some form of democratic legitimacy. There is a difference with Australian arrangements which is too obvious to require spelling out. However, this point should not be overstressed, because the Austrian President has, if anything, more democratic legitimacy, being directly elected by the people, so the number of vetoes of Bills is obviously not directly proportional to the number of electors for the post of head of state! A third level on which tradition and systematics may differ between Germany and Australia is in the more subtle level of 'atmosphere'. In a republic each office-holder has a sphere of responsibility allocated by the constitution and is responsible to the res publica for discharging that responsibility conscientiously. If that requires of the nonparty head of state the occasional decision which might be characterised as a rebuke to politicians, then that need must be accepted as part of the system under which all office-holders are mere instruments of the constitution, and servants of the state. On the other hand, even in Australia, where the mystique of monarchy has been attenuated almost to vanishing point, something still remains of the need to keep the monarchy and the Monarch's representatives completely above political and legal strife, avoiding the expression of any opinion whatsoever in formal constitutional functions such as assenting to laws which is opposed to that of the government in power. Furthermore, it is not usual to speak of the monarchy's duties to the constitution; rather, we tend to focus on the advice which politicians may constitutionally give to the Crown and leave the Crown entirely out of day-to-day concerns. It is seen as desirable for the Crown's representative not to engage in disagreements with the elected government even on dry legal questions, and it would hardly be possible to maintain this if occasional outbreaks of disagreement occurred as they have in Germany.
In a republic, too, duties to the constitutional order tend to be seen in more black and white terms. Perhaps this tendency is further accentuated by the fact that Germany is a land of codifications. This difference is highlighted when one finds Professor Schoch in case 9 arguing that the Federal President had no discretion at all but was required to refuse assent in that case because the Bill concerned was unconstitutional. 147 It is apparent that I (along with at least one German scholar) 148 would have matters decided even in Germany on a somewhat different and more complicated basis, having regard to political as well as legal realities. Like Geoffrey Sawer in relation to the crisis of 1975, 149 I would insist on speaking of discretions rather than duties; but it is not possible for me to say how much of that is merely my common law training and habits of thought. At any rate, it is hard to imagine an Australian taking a similar black and white view in a case such as case 9, which did not involve the remotest danger to the continued existence of the democratic system itself.
Indeed, the German experience emphasises the dangers of vetoing laws to the good relations that should exist between the non-party head of state and the elected government. Case 9 in particular illustrates the sort of noises a government can make if displeased by a presidential veto on grounds which it considers open to doubt. These stresses and strains can be accommodated in a republic, but no Vice-Regal representative in Australia would be well advised to act in such a way. Even in Germany, the current Federal President is most unlikely to wish to provoke another such confrontation by vetoing further Bills, while for its part the government too will be on its guard in order to avoid an unprecedented third case; no doubt relations between the two parties have suffered and the easy confidence and frankness that we in Australia expect to exist between the head of state and head of government may well have been impaired, at least temporarily, in Germany.
There are certainly also practical difficulties with vetoing laws which may explain the contrary attitude taken in Australia. Obviously, the German practice means that an initial decision is taken in the Federal President's office; staff are employed at public expense to do the job which can almost always be done instead by the Court. Whether or not outside legal advice is sought, as is apparently considered to be unexceptionable 150 and is doubtless sometimes necessary if this function is to be discharged properly, the Bill's assessors are anonymous and not subject to anywhere _____________________________________________________________________________________ 147 Schoch, above n 56, 267. 148 See Maurer, above n 23. 149 Sawer, above n 144, 159-60. 150 As Anders points out, there is no written prohibition on taking this course, and in a country of codes that is equivalent to permission: Anders, above n 17, 657.
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Volume 36 ____________________________________________________________________________________ near the same degree of quality control 151 or public and professional criticism of their opinions, views and performance as the judges. 152 Reasons may or may not be given -no public reasons were given in case 3, for example, 153 although all recent cases have been accompanied by a short statement -and, if given, reasons are brief and published at the discretion of the Federal President. The issue is, in other words, shifted from a public arena to a private one with all the disadvantages for open government that that entails.
One does wonder whether the Germans really do need to have resort to the 'nuclear option' of veto by the head of state, when perhaps simpler methods of dealing with the problem might suffice. Advisory opinions might be reintroduced. 154 While even former Federal President Rau opposed this idea on the grounds that they are not the function of the courts, 155 and advisory opinions are officially banned in this country, 156 I think that this is too black and white a view. Canadian practice, 157 not to mention our own local practice under which Attorneys-General can sue for declarations as to the validity of a law, 158 suggests that judgments unattached to any concrete controversy are by no means incompatible with the concept of judicial power. In fact they are known in Germany too: the equivalent procedure there is known there as abstrakte Normenkontrolle (abstract examination of laws), and if a Federal President were ever sued for a declaration that his non-assent was not required by the law a similar examination of a proposed law divorced from a concrete case of its application would happen. 159 It is hard to see why advisory opinions would be objected to given that they are currently practised under another name, and no undue outbreak of judicial empire-building or collapse of confidence in the judicial system has resulted.
Certainly an advisory opinion in the Immigration Bill case of 2002 would have enabled Federal President Rau neatly to avoid the issue presented to him without endorsing either the Bill and the apparent constitutional breach involved in the Bill's enactment nor yet the opposition's very strongly urged view that the Bill was invalid. Advisory opinions would certainly be far preferable to the creation of controversy around the office of Federal President whenever there are reasons to doubt the constitutionality of a Bill and a decision whether to assent is expected.
Whether or not advisory opinions are re-introduced, if it is thought that standing rules are too narrow to permit a challenge to some Bills -as was suggested in cases 7 and 8 -then perhaps they should be liberalised. At the moment the most commonly applicable rule is that one-third of the members of the Bundestag have standing to challenge legislation. 160 This is far too high and excludes the smaller parties which obtain seats through the prevailing system of proportional representation, which, in this regard, should be better exploited. One might even ask whether there is any reason why any member of Parliament who voted against a Bill should not have standing to challenge it. 161 The French Constitution, although its rules about the permissibility of challenges in general might be thought more restrictive, provides standing to sixty members of the National Assembly, just over 10 per cent of its membership. 162 There is certainly much to be said for a mildly restrictive approach to standing in general 163 but in relation to a member of Parliament these arguments have much lesser weight: if the power to seek a ruling by the Court is abused, the member will suffer the consequences in the public arena. If standing rules are so restrictive that they shift the pressure to consider arguments about unconstitutionality from the courts to the head of state, they are worse than useless.
Thought might also be given to procedural changes designed to reduce the number of occasions on which the veto is required. For example, if more Bills are vetoed because of constitutional difficulties with small parts of them as in case 9, there could be a provision permitting the Federal President to send Bills back to the Bundestag with suggested amendments. Such provisions already exist in several constitutions. 164 It would obviously be necessary for this purpose to uncouple such provisions from any requirement that they might be exercised only on the advice of the government, as exists in at least some Australian jurisdictions 165 and possibly India. 166 As far as what happens after referral back without advice is concerned, the South African Constitution provides that, if a Bill is referred back to Parliament and the President's objections are not accommodated, he or she must either assent or refer the Bill to the Constitutional Court. 167 One area in which German rules of constitutional procedure certainly do promote the occasional presidential veto is the capacity to challenge non-assent in court. This difference is another instance of the way in which the monarchical heritage of Australia continues to rule us, if not from its grave, then at least from a retirement home from which it rarely emerges: one could hardly imagine a suit designed to test whether a Vice-Regal refusal to assent was correct in which the Governor-General or Governor was required to defend his non-assent before the courts. In the United Kingdom, of course, Her Majesty the Queen could not be sued for refusing to assent to a Bill, and no doubt this immunity attaches to those who exercise federal 168 and State 169 executive power in her name here.
As far as the common law is concerned, administrative law has made great strides in this area over the last half-century or so, but such high constitutional decisions are certainly still not susceptible to judicial review, 170 even if a simple error of law were alleged to be the basis of a Vice-Regal decision. Even an action for a declaration, designed to establish the fact (if it were the fact) that assent had been refused as a result of misunderstanding the law, would no doubt fail. There would be great difficulty even in identifying a proper plaintiff, particularly if non-assent occurred on ministerial advice, while in other cases the spectacle would be presented of the ViceRegal office-holder's being dragged through the courts by one of his constitutional advisors, presumably the Attorney-General. Above all, no-one has a right to have royal assent granted to a Bill which would support a suit for a declaration of right. If the law of this country provided for advisory opinions, that road might be chosen, but of course it does not.
A few cases do admittedly exist in which a mere Bill has been brought before the courts for appraisal -Attorney-General (NSW) v Trethowan 171 is the best-known example -but in such cases the question has been whether a Bill might lawfully be presented by Ministers of the Crown for the royal assent despite a 'manner and form' provision apparently preventing that, and whether the provision was effective. There was no review of Vice-Regal objections to a Bill that had already been presented for royal assent, and to which royal assent had been denied. Furthermore, those cases have been declared to be rare exceptions, bordering on indefensible anomalies, 172 and they are therefore not likely to provide sound analogies in new situations. Unless some great ingenuity is manifested in the future, there is therefore no way in which Bills can be brought before the courts for a general declaration of their validity until -and unless -royal assent is granted to them.
Assuming therefore that the refusal of a Vice-Regal officer could no more be brought before a court in this country than could a similar refusal by the Queen in the United Kingdom, the law of Germany differs in an important respect from our law. Current German law is also unlike that of the Weimar Republic, 173 let alone the Second Reich Monarchy (1871-1918), 174 which did not permit curial challenges to non-assent. This is another interesting example of the manner in which changes in the law can have the opposite result to that which at first sight might be expected. The potential for a refusal of assent to be reviewed by the courts might, one would expect at first blush, lead to a reduction in the practice of refusal, as heads of state would be fearful of sustaining a loss and losing face. Far from it: combined with the reluctance of politicians to sue the head of state, it has in fact made Federal Presidents more confident in cases in which they are convinced that the Bill is invalid. They do not have to listen to meretricious arguments from their governments to the contrary, let alone act on them as the Crown in Australia sometimes has to do. Rather, they can dare them to seek a determination of the question from the ultimate arbiter.
It is nevertheless open to some question whether Germany has gained much as a result of the greater willingness of the head of state to veto legislation. The controversy which attaches in some such cases to the office of Federal President may mean that the game is not worth the candle. It is very hard to see why any of the cases could not have been dealt with by less dramatic means, especially if the standing rules were liberalised. There is a lot to be said for our rule which protects the Crown from making similar decisions. Although our rule may seem an example of institutionalised hypocrisy and unnecessary limitations imposed by a lack of democratic legitimacy and tradition, the most noticeable outcome of what appears at first sight to be the more honest, rational and rule-of-law-respecting German position is the creation of trouble between the head of state and the head of government for no essential purpose.
Some of this might be avoided if art 82(1) were clearer or other amendments made, but more radically, the power to assent -really a remnant of the more or less constitutional monarchy that disappeared in 1918 -might be wholly abolished. Bills passed by Parliament could be published on the authority of the Presidents of each House 175 as nothing more than a certification that the Bill has indeed received the assent of the House concerned. This is already the system in some German States 176 _____________________________________________________________________________________ 173 Anders, above n 17, 656. 174 Hallier, above n 17, 404. 175 Berger, above n 67, 9; Friesenhahn, above n 9, 682; Heyde, above n 95, 797-8; Lücke, above n 20, 1688. 176 Schümer, above n 82, 93-4. and the Australian Capital Territory, 177 and in Malaysia the King has thirty days to assent, failing which he is deemed to have done so. 178 In cases of disagreement in Germany about whether the Bundesrat is required to be involved in the legislative procedure, there would of course be a difficulty in determining who should take responsibility for publishing the Bill. 179 But the nonparticipation of the President of the Bundesrat in the publication of a disputed Bill would certainly do nothing to conceal this issue from the Court and would therefore not cause any harm at all. An express qualification could be added in very rare cases such as arose in 2002 in which the fact of approval by one House of Parliament is open to serious dispute.
At best, assent can be defended as having emblematic value: the Federal President's signature symbolises the subscription of the whole nation to a new legal norm after the conclusion of the legislative process, often dominated by partisan political considerations. 180 But if this symbol were abolished, would the law's authority really suffer, given that everyone knows that the Federal President usually assents automatically, and that his assent is close to meaningless as a symbol? If the power to assent were abolished, final and effective assent to disputed legislation would then be given, in cases of doubt, by a judgment of the Federal Constitutional Court in its favour.
Except in cases in which the entire constitutional order is under threat from proposed legislation, in which the one notorious precedent that exists suggests that Realpolitik pressures will be overwhelming anyway, it is hard to see what real value is added to a republican constitutional system by the power to assent. A symbolic act in a constitutional monarchy, if translated into a republican system, is out of place and can on occasions be mischievous, because it has to be taken seriously by a republican head of state who cannot shelter behind the mystique of a crown.
